// NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE
HubN

HubN

A private network project for experimenting with BGP, DNS, certificates, RPKI and the software around them.

BGPDNSRPKIRustAutomation
OPERATING / EVOLVINGCONTROL PLANE / ONLINE
Core ideaParticipant-operated private network
Control planeRegistry-driven
TrustCA, DNSSEC and RPKI
ImplementationRust, Go and automation
// OBSERVED ROUTING

A network I can still follow end to end

HubN is a private network where participants run autonomous systems, receive address and naming resources and establish real routing relationships. It uses many of the same ideas as a public network, but at a size where I can still follow what every part is doing.

It began with allocation, configuration and documentation projects. It has since grown services for registry state, routing visibility, certificate-backed identity, DNS, route-origin authorization, provisioning and deployment.

LOOKING GLASS / TOPOLOGY24 AS TEST LAB
The 24-AS HubN peering test-lab topology as observed by the route collector
This is the peering test lab, not the real HubN topology. The view is built from routes observed across the lab's 24 autonomous systems.
// SERVICE GRAPH

Registry and network services

HubN is not one daemon. It is a collection of systems which have to agree without pretending they all own the same state.

01

Registry

Owns ASNs, prefixes, anycast addresses, zones, certificates and peering agreements.

REQUESTED STATE
02

Portal

Turns ownership, policy and limits into a usable workflow instead of exposing the Registry API directly.

PARTICIPANT CONTROL
03

DNS

Coordinators and authoritative roots publish the private hierarchy, DNSSEC chain and signed reverse delegations.

NAMING PLANE
04

CA + RKV

Issues service and identity certificates while long-lived signing keys stay away from ordinary workloads.

MACHINE IDENTITY
05

RPKI

Turns Registry routing intent into signed ROAs and publishes coherent object generations over RRDP.

ORIGIN AUTHORITY
06

WHOIS + IRR

Publishes registration data and feeds the prefix filters used by generated BGP configurations.

POLICY INPUT
07

Looking Glass

Collects routes, session state and topology without pretending configured must mean established.

OBSERVED STATE
08

Automation

Handles certificate activation, deployments and the repetitive gaps between otherwise separate services.

RECONCILIATION
// PARTICIPANT PATH

From resource request to live route

The portal carries a participant from identity and allocations to negotiated transport, rendered configuration and independent observation.

  1. 01

    Claim resources

    Create a handle, request an ASN and address space, then publish naming and certificate intent under explicit ownership limits.

  2. 02

    Negotiate peering

    Two ASNs agree on bilateral peering or transit and choose direct transport, WireGuard or IPsec without replacing working links unnecessarily.

  3. 03

    Render policy

    The portal generates guides for BIRD2, FRR, VyOS or Pathvector using the agreed transport, IRR data and route-origin policy.

  4. 04

    Observe reality

    An isolated lab drives the real portal, deploys both sides and checks tunnels, BGP, filters, RPKI transitions and collector visibility.

// RECONCILIATION MODEL

State synchronization and reconciliation

The Registry is authoritative for allocations and requested state. Operational truth stays with the system which actually owns it. Updates are recorded through a transactional outbox and delivered at least once; consumers tolerate duplicates, while periodic full passes repair anything missed during a longer outage.

Keeping these states separate is more honest than one green badge. A request can be accepted while transport is pending. A tunnel can be up while BGP is down. BGP can be established before the collector has seen it.

REQUESTED STATEOBSERVED STATE
Peering acceptedTransport pending
Transport configuredTunnel established
BGP requestedSession established
Prefix authorizedCollector visibility
// TRUST PATHS

Certificates, DNSSEC and RPKI

X.509

Certificates

Who is this machine?

Service identity follows a CA and remote signing path designed to keep long-lived keys away from ordinary application workloads.

DNSSEC

Naming

Is this answer authentic?

The private root and reverse hierarchy publish signed generations and verify complete candidate zones before replacing live data.

RPKI

Routing

Who may originate this prefix?

Signed route-origin objects move as coherent generations so manifests, CRLs, snapshots and deltas cannot describe different worlds.

PUBLICATION BOUNDARY

This page documents architecture and lessons. It intentionally does not publish source code, an operational map, credentials, private endpoints or a live inventory. The implementation and operational material remain private.

HubN is where most of my networking, systems programming and automation experiments eventually meet. It is never really finished; there is always another failure to test or manual step which has become annoying enough to automate.